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I. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, on November 23, 1988, the Court granted United Television, 
Inc.'s petition for interlocutory appeal. United Television, 
Inc. appeals an interlocutory order of the Third Judicial 
District Court dated October 17, 1988 granting in part and 
denying in part Salt Lake City Corporation's motion for a 
protective order to prevent discovery of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department's Internal Affairs files and personnel files 
concerning Office David Madsen, the plaintiff in this action. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Are the Salt Lake City Police Department's Internal 
Affairs files compiled on Salt Lake City Police Officer David 
Madsen, which contain the investigations of citizen complaints 
about Officer Madsen, protected from discovery by either a 
statutory or common law privilege in a defamation action brought 
by the police officer against a media defendant in which the 
officer claims the media defendant broadcast false information 
x0n November 28, 1988, the Court also granted deponent 
Salt Lake City Corporation's petition for interlocutory appeal 
from the same order. 
about his record with the police department and thereby damaged 
his reputation with the public and within the police department. 
III. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
U.S. CONST. Amend I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances. 
UTAH CONST. ART. I, SECTION 15 
(Pertinent Part) 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(5) (1987 REPLACEMENT) 
There are particular relations in which it is the policy 
of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it 
inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness 
in the following cases: 
. . . 
(5) A public officer cannot be examined as 
to communications made to him in official 
confidence when the public interests would 
suffer by the disclosure. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, On March 24, 1988, David Madsen 
("Madsen"), a Salt Lake City police officer, filed a verified 
complaint against United Television, Inc. ("United Television") 
and John Harrington for defamation. (R. 2-7). The verified 
complaint alleged that KTVX Television, Channel 4, which is owned 
by United Television, defamed Madsen during certain news 
broadcast reporting on a shooting incident which occurred on 
October 26, 1987 in which Madsen shot and killed Clemente 
Garcia. (R. 2-7, & 113) 
B. Proceedings Below. United Television subpoenaed 
Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City") requiring it to produce 
documents regarding the events which led to the death of Clemente 
Garcia and documents concerning Madsen1s performance record as a 
police officer. The subpoena specifically included a request to 
produce: 
4. All documents which refer or 
relate in any way to any complaints or 
inquiries by anyone, whether oral or written, 
formal or informal, concerning Officer David 
Madsen and the performance of his duties as a 
Salt Lake City Police Officer from the time he 
joined the Salt Lake City Police Department to 
the present. 
5. All documents which refer or 
relate in any way to any internal 
investigation, whether conducted by the Salt 
Lake City Police Department Internal Affairs, 
or any other internal department concerning 
Officer David Madsen and the performance of 
his duties as a Salt Lake City Police Officer 
from the time he joined the Salt Lake City 
Police Department to the present. 
United Television also subpoenaed Madsenfs official 
"personnel file." (R. 24-27). 
On May 26, 1988, the City moved the trial court for 
a protective order to prevent disclosure of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department's Internal Affairs files and Madsen's 
personnel records, claiming that the documents were 
privileged. (R. 93-96).2 
After a hearing, on October 17, 1988, the trial 
court issued an order denying in part and granting in part 
the City's motion for a protective order. (R. 248-49, 
Addendum 1). The court ordered the City to produce Madsenfs 
personnel file and designated portions of the Internal 
Affairs files concerning Madsen. The court ordered the City 
to produce each document in the Internal Affairs files 
containing an initial complaint against Madsen and the 
documents containing the final disposition of each 
complaint. The court's order, however, allowed the City to 
delete all names on those documents and withhold all other 
2The city did produce the "shoot review" file containing 
the investigation of the shooting of Clemente Garcia. 
documents contained in the files which were gathered or 
produced during the investigation. (Id.) 
On October 3, 1988, United Television filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's first 
cause of action. (R. 221-22). In the first cause of 
action, Madsen alleged that he was a private person and 
United Television negligently defamed him.3 (R. 2-7). 
United Television claimed that it was entitled to summary 
judgment on the first cause of action because the statements 
about Madsen and the incident are subject to a qualified 
privilege under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and under the Utah Constitution, Art. I § 15. 
(R. 221-243). On December 2, 1988, the court issued an 
order granting United Television's motion for partial 
summary judgment finding that Officer Madsen is a public 
official within the meaning of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and also is a public figure 
within the meaning of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323 (1974) (R. 304-05) and, therefore, Madsen is required to 
JThe second cause of action alleged alternatively that 
if Madsen was a public official or a public figure that United 
Television acted with actual malice. 
prove actual malice to recover on a defamation action 
against United Television. (Id.)4 
C. Statement of Facts. On October 26, 1987, 
Madsen was involved in a shooting "incident" on a public 
street in Salt Lake County in which he shot and killed 
Clemente Garcia ("Garcia"). (R. 224). Early in the evening 
of October 26f 1987, Garciafs wife had called the police 
reporting a dispute with her husband and requesting police 
assistance. As the police arrived at Garcia!s home, he 
drove away in his truck. A car chase through the streets of 
Salt Lake County followed and ultimately involved at least 
fourteen police cars. Madsen, who was not one of the 
officers responding to the initial call, eventually joined 
the chase in Emmigration Canyon. Madsen brought the case to 
a halt when he blocked the road, forcing Garcia to stop. 
When Garcia stepped out of his car carrying a weapon, he was 
immediately confronted by Madsen, who had placed himself 
openly on the road, ignoring the need for protective 
cover. When Garcia, who was armed, turned towards Madsen, 
Madsen opened fire. Garcia was killed. When Madsen started 
40n January 17, 1989, this court granted David Madsenfs 
petition for interlocutory appeal of the December 2, 1988 order 
granting United Television.,- Inc.'s motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
shooting, other police officers who were in the approximate 
line of fire, had to seek protection from Madsen's 
bullets. (R. 226-27). 
The facts and circumstances surrounding this tragic 
shooting were presented to the public by KTVX Television, 
Channel 4 during regular evening and nightly news 
broadcasts. As a result of information supplied by other 
police officers and private citizens, KTVX also broadcast 
reports on Madsenfs questionable actions immediately 
preceding the shooting and his past performance record as a 
police officer. All the news coverage focused on the 
killing of Garcia and the role Madsen's history of abusive 
conduct might have played in that shooting. (R. 227). 
Madsen commenced this defamation action against 
United Television claiming that he was defamed by the news 
broadcasts. Madsen alleges in his complaint that the 
televised reports contained defamatory information, 
including that he "had a poor record with the police 
department; was in the process of being fired or removed 
from the police department; had acted with disregard for the 
safety of others and in violation of police standards and 
rules regarding the incident on the 26th of October, 1987; 
and had discharged his weapon on that occasion causing the 
death of another improperly and without good reason and in 
violation of established police policies in the situation as 
faced by Plaintiff." (R. 2-7, Complaint 11 5). 
Madsen complains that his reputation, including his 
reputation among his fellow police officers, has been 
damaged and "besmirched." He also claims that his "ability 
to perform his duties as a police officer have been impaired 
and his safety endangered." (R. 2-7). 
After the action was begunf United Television 
subpoenaed Salt Lake City Corporation requiring it to 
produce documents regarding the events which led to the 
death of Garcia and documents concerning Madsen1s 
performance as a police officer. (R. 21-23). The City 
refused to produce the Internal Affairs documents concerning 
Madsen and Madsenfs personnel file, claiming the documents 
were privileged and moved the court for a protective 
order. (R. 93-96). The City did provide United Television 
with an edited list of the formal complaints brought against 
Madsen by members of the general public. (R. 158-62f 
Addendum 2). 
The list revealed seventy-seven citizen complaints 
filed against Madsen with the police department's Internal 
Affairs Division. (Id.) The list does not contain the 
names of the complainants, merely a generic statement about 
the substance of the charge, the date of the incident giving 
rise to the charge, and the Internal Affairs Division's 
disposition of the complaint. (Id.) 
The seventy-seven complaints include: "threats 
with shotgun," "police brutality," "excessive force," 
"officer put shotgun in face," "attempt to extort money from 
Masseuse," "assault/gun in face," "unnecessary 
roughness/rudeness," "macing of prisoner," "unnecessary use 
of service revolver," "illegal search and entry," "improper 
handling of shotgun," "missing property," and "abuse of 
authority/excessive force." (Id.) 
Five of the complaints were "sustained" by the 
Internal Affairs investigators. (Id.) A complaint is 
"sustained" when the investigator and the chief of police 
conclude that the event did occur and that the officer is 
either guilty of the conduct charged or guilty of some other 
infraction. (R. 136). The "sustained" complaints include 
"macing a prisoner," "illegal search and entry," and 
"excessive force." (R. 158-62, Addendum 2). 
Nineteen other charges were "not sustained." 
(Id.) "Not sustained" does not mean that Madsen did not 
commit the alleged acts. When the Internal Affairs Division 
designates a complaint "not sustained" it merely means that 
the police investigators, who are investigating one of their 
ownf did not believe there were sufficient facts to 
determine whether or not the police officer was guilty of 
the offense. (R. 139). 
"Unfounded" and "exonerated" designations were 
assigned by Internal Affairs investigators to many of the 
charges brought against Madsen. "Unfounded" means that the 
complaint, as reported, did not occur; whereas "exonerated" 
means that the events did occur but in the opinion of the 
investigating officer, the officer's actions were lawful and 
reasonable. (Id.) Numerous other charges were simply 
"closed" without explanation. (R. 158-62, Addendum 2). 
The edited list provided to United Television 
supplied no substantive information regarding the complaints 
or persons filing those charges. (Id.) The identity of the 
investigating officers, the citizen complainants and other 
witnesses were not disclosed. (Id.) 
United Television wishes to obtain the Internal 
Affairs and the personnel records of Officer Madsen in order 
to defend itself properly against the defamation claims. 
United Television believes that these documents contain 
important relevant evidence concerning Officer Madsenfs 
reputation in the community and within the police 
department. These documents also contain the names of 
witnesses who may be qualified to testify about these 
issues. Additionally, United Television believes that these 
documents contain evidence that demonstrates the 
truthfulness of United Television's broadcasts concerning 
Madsenfs record with the police department. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Internal Affairs1 files concerning Officer 
Madsen are relevant to United Television's defense of this 
defamation action. These files not only contain evidence 
demonstrating the truth of the statements broadcast by 
United Television but also contain evidence concerning 
Madsenfs reputation within the community and within the 
police department. These are matters which have been put at 
issue by Madsen and to which United Television as a private 
litigant/ is entitled to full discovery. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(5) which establishes a 
qualified privilege concerning confidential communications 
made to a public officer does not apply to this situation. 
The statute applies only to state secrets and communications 
from confidential informants. These files do not contain 
any such information. The public interest will not be 
harmed by disclosure. Rather, the important public 
interests of encouraging complaints about abusive and 
illegal police actions and encouraging police investigatory 
thoroughness when investigating such allegations will be 
enhanced. Also, the public's interest in a fair trial and 
protecting the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the 
press favor disclosure. 
3. The common law executive privilege does not 
shield these documents from discovery. The application of 
this privilege requires a balancing of the interests 
favoring non-disclosure with those favoring disclosure. The 
City has made no empirical showing to support its claim that 
the public interest would be harmed by disclosure. 
Furthermore, when balanced against the obvious and 
justifiable interests of the public in a free and vigorous 
investigatory press and a private litigant's right to 
discover exculpatory evidence, the privilege must be 
rejected in this instance. 
4. The information in the Internal Affairs1 files 
is not protected by either the work product doctrine or the 
attorney-client privilege. The information was compiled by 
the police department in the normal course of its business, 
investigating citizen complaints. The files were not 
prepared in anticipation of litigation. Nor were these 
files generated as a result of any exclusive consultation 
process between a lawyer and a client. As suchf the 
attorney-client privilege is not applicable. 
5. The Utah Archives and Records Services and 
Information Practices Actf Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 - 90, 
and the Utah Public and' Private Writings Actf Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-26-2, do not create any privilege. Those statutes 
regulate the general public's access to official records and 
are not intended to infringe upon a private litigant's right 
to conduct discovery under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
6. The trial court abused its discretion when it 
did not permit full discovery of this information. The 
trial court accepted without proof the City's assertion that 
the public interest would be harmed if the information in 
unredacted form was produced. The court did not follow the 
balancing procedures required. A fair balancing of all the 
factors requires that the files be produced in their 
entirety. 
VI. 
THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS FILES COMPILED ON 
OFFICER MADSEN ARE NOT PROTECTED BY 
EITHER A STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE 
A. The Complete Internal Affairs1 Files Are 
Relevant to the Issues Raised in This Action. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 26(b)(1) explicitly allows a party to "obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether 
it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking 
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other 
party . . . ." These documents are "relevant to the subject 
matter" of this action. 
Madsen alleges that the broadcasts were 
"defamatory" and that "as a result of [the] defamation [he] 
has suffered injury to his reputation." (R. 2-7). Utah 
Code Ann. § 45-2-2 defines the elements of libel and 
slander: 
(1) "Libel" means a malicious defamation, 
expressed either by printing or by signs 
or pictures or the like, tending to 
blacken the memory of one who is dead, or 
to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue 
or reputation, or publish the natural 
defects of one who is alive and thereby to 
expose him to public hatred, contempt or 
ridicule. 
(2) "Slander" means any libel communicat-
ed by spoken words. 
Madsen claims the broadcasts, including the portions about his 
record with the Police Department, were "false and untrue" and 
that he "has always enjoyed a good reputation for honesty, 
uprightness of character, truthfulness and responsible 
performance of his employment." (R. 1-7, Verified Complaint 1MI 7 
and 9). 
United Television has affirmatively alleged that "the 
broadcast . . . contained information which was substantially 
correct and true" and denied that Madsenfs reputation was as lily 
white as he claims. (R. 10-17, Verified Answer 1111 9 and 26). 
In a defamation action "[t]ruth of the words spoken is 
always a defense . . . ." Direct Import Buyers1 Association v. 
K.S.L., Inc., 572 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1977); Ogden Buslines v. 
KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1976); Restatement of Torts, 
Second, § 581A. Furthermore, even a private defamation 
plaintiff, as distinguished from a public figure or a public 
official, in a case against the media may only recover actual 
damages, usually measured by the damage to his reputation. Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974). "[T]he more 
customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood 
include impairment of reputation and standing in the 
community . . . ." Id. at 350. 
The Internal Affairs1 files are part of Madsen's record 
within the police department. The documents are relevant to the 
essential defense in this action: the truth. Additionally, the 
citizen complainants, the witnesses who spoke to the Internal 
Affairs' investigators, the investigators themselves and the 
reviewing supervisory police officers all possess relevant 
evidence about Madsen's reputation. These witnesses will 
establish what, if any, damage has been done to Madsen's 
reputation. These documents are discoverable under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 26(b)(1). 
B. The Statutory Privilege Does Not Apply to These 
Documents. In the proceedings below, the City asserted that the 
Internal Affairs files are protected by the statutory privilege 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(5) which reads, in 
pertinent part: 
There are particular relations in which it is 
the policy of the law to encourage confidence 
and to preserve it inviolate. Therefore, a 
person cannot be examined as a witness in the 
following cases: 
* * * 
(5) A public officer cannot be 
examined as to communications made to him in 
official confidence when the public interests 
would suffer by the disclosure. 
By the explicit terms of the statute, this 
privilege applies only to examination of an officer 
concerning his confidential communications with another 
person (e.g., informant) and not to documentary materials 
contained in an Internal Affairs file or prepared in 
connection with an Internal Affairs investigation. 
In State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 P. 1000, 1004 
(1909) this Court, construing the predecessor to 78-24-8(5), 
held: 
That subdivision relates especially to 
matters pertaining to the affairs of the 
state or nation, or concerning state 
secrets, and communications by informers 
to public officials. 
Id. 102 P. at 1004 (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, to the extent this statutory privilege 
would apply, it is not an absolute privilege, but a qualified 
privilege, triggered only when "the public interests would suffer 
by disclosure.11 In Barfield v. City of Seattle, 676 P. 2d 438 
(Wash. 1984), the Supreme Court of Washington held that Wash. 
Rev. Code § 5.60.060(5), which is identical to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-24-8(5), did not prohibit the discovery of Seattle Police 
Department Internal Investigation files. 
In Barfield, two consolidated actions against the City 
of Seattle and various police officers, the plaintiffs alleged, 
among other things, tortious conduct by police officers, 
negligent hiring, retention and discipline, and conspiracy to 
deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. The 
plaintiffs sought discovery of relevant police department 
internal investigation files involving prior complaints against 
the officers in order to prove that a pattern of excessive force 
and misconduct by Seattle police officers was tolerated and 
concealed. Id. at 440. 
The City argued that disclosure of the files would 
inhibit effective law enforcement and the confidential reporting 
of complaints. The trial court disagreed and was affirmed by the 
reviewing court: 
Disclosure of the [Seattle Police 
Department Internal Investigation Files] has a 
very slight potentiality of harming the 
public, especially in a legal proceeding where 
judicial controls can be imposed. 
Id. at 441. Cf. Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747 P.2d 
1058 (Utah App. 1987) . 
In State v. Hoben, supra, this Court, explained 
that this subdivision may only be used to exclude evidence 
"upon the grounds of public policy, because of the 
confidential nature of such communications when the 
disclosure would prejudice, in the language of the statute, 
'public interests.1 " Id^ 102 P. at 1005. Here the City 
argued that disclosure of this information will harm the 
public interest because police officers would not accurately 
report or investigate the complaints. The City asserted: 
1. Discovery would impair and cause 
a "chilling effect" on the ability of a police 
administrator to obtain full and candid 
reporting from officers, if their statements 
are discoverable in criminal or civil cases. 
2. It would be unfair to usef in 
outside trials, statements taken from officers 
who voluntarily made confidential statements 
to assist the department in its quest for 
efficiency and integrity. It would be even 
more unfair to use statements compelled from 
officers under threat of discharge. 
3. Police administrators would be 
encouraged not to fulfill their duty to fully 
investigate internal complaints if the results 
are discoverable. It is even possible that in 
the future personnel records would only 
contain laudatory matters. 
(R. 84) 
The unpalatable implication of these assertions is 
that police officers, when required to report on fellow 
officers' conduct, may lie or dissemble if they know they 
may be required to give the same testimony in court under 
oath. 
In King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 
Judge Weinstein was confronted with the same exact argument 
when the plaintiffs in a civil rights action attempted to 
discover the internal affairs files concerning the police 
officer defendants. Judge Weinstein was rightfully 
unimpressed. 
This argument is probably often 
overstated, and courts should be weary of 
relying on it in restricting 
discovery. . . . An officer's incentives to 
hide a friend's misconduct, or to be 
scrupulously forthcoming lest he be 
disciplined for having concealed information, 
are probably much more closely tied to the 
internal investigative machinery than to the 
fear of . . . litigation. . . . 
In sum, disclosure to . . . litigants 
is probably a minute influence on officers' 
candor. 
Id. at 192-93. 
The same argument was also rejected in Kelly v. 
City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987) another 
civil rights action against allegedly abusive police 
officers. In fact, that court believed the opposite was 
true and wrote: 
Fear of scrutiny by knowledgeable 
people motivated to be aggressive is likely to 
inspire police officers to conduct 
investigations and write reports that are less 
vulnerable to criticism, and the way to make 
them less vulnerable is to make them more 
thorough, more accurate and better reasoned. 
In short, officers will feel pressure to be 
honest and logical when they know that their 
statements and their work product will be 
subject to demanding analysis by people with 
knowledge of the events under investigation 
and considerable incentive to make sure that 
the truth comes out. . . . 
Id. at 665. The Kelly court concluded: 
Thus, the possibility of disclosure 
to a civil litigant probably adds almost 
nothing to the pressure to dissemble that 
officers already would feel; those who are 
going to lie are going to do so regardless of 
whether there is some chance of disclosure to 
a citizen complainant. 
Id. See also, Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520, 
522 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("No legitimate purpose is served by 
conducting investigations under a veil of near-total 
secrecy. Rather, knowledge that a limited number of 
persons, as well as a state or federal court may examine the 
file in the event of civil litigation may serve to insure 
that these investigations are carried out in an even handed 
fashion, that the statements are carefully and accurately 
taken, and that the true facts come to light, whether they 
reflect favorably on the individual police officers involved 
or on the department as a whole.11) 
Likewise, in this instance, there will be little, 
if any, harm to the public interest if the materials are 
disclosed. These files do not contain "state secrets" or 
communications from confidential "informers" prepared in the 
course of a criminal investigation. Cf. State v. Hoben, 
supra. These files contain complaints to the Police 
Department by citizens about police misconduct. These 
people have already come forward to the particular 
governmental agency they contend acted against their 
rights. There is no reason to believe disclosure will 
discourage future citizen complaints. 
Again, Judge Weinstein in King v. Conde, supra, 
addressed this very issue. 
Defendants may argue that citizen 
complainants will be less vocal if their 
complaints against the police are subject to 
disclosure to civil rights plaintiffs. This, 
too, is an empirical question, but the more 
persuasive hypothesis is that disclosure will 
have no influence on citizen complainants. 
"It is not at all clear that people who feel 
aggrieved by actions of police officers would 
even think about the possibility that their 
complaints might be disclosed to another 
person who feels aggrieved by police 
officers." Kelly, supra, 114 F.R.D. at 666. 
Presumably those who did think about 
disclosure would ordinarily approve of it, 
because they would hope to assist others 
similarly aggrieved. See id. In the usual 
case, this factor should be accorded little 
weight. See also Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 
F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
Id. 121 F.R.D. at 193-94. 
Even the police department does not treat this 
information as privileged. When a citizen complains about 
an officer, "upon request, an accused officer will be 
furnished a copy of the complaint." Salt Lake City Police 
Department Staff Inspections Division, Internal Affairs 
Procedures, October 1, 1977, p. 1, 11 A. 2, Addendum 3. Even 
the entire completed investigation file is "available for 
inspection by others." The chief of police "may personally 
authorize" the release of the file and the information it 
contains to an accused officer's own attorney to be used in 
the officer's "defense." _Id. p. 7, 11 4.1, Addendum 3. 
United Television needs the unedited version of 
Internal Affairs files in order to compile information 
essential to proving Madsen's record with the department was 
as the news sources reported. The files are also highly 
relevant to demonstrate what Madsen's reputation was and is 
in the community, including among the citizen 
complainants. The files will also shed light on Madsen's 
reputation within the police department, including the 
investigating and reviewing officers, as well as possibly 
others who took part in the investigations. Deleting the 
identity of the officers involved in the investigation, the 
complaining parties, and other witnesses precludes United 
Television from identifying the witnesses who can testify to 
the specific claim that Madsen has placed at issue: his 
reputation. 
The requested information in these files will 
certainly show that Madsen, as a result of the voluminous 
charges brought against himf had a bad reputation for 
honesty, uprightness of character, truthfulness and 
responsible professional performance within the police 
department and among a significant portion of the community 
he serves. Likewise, the references made to Madsenfs 
professional record in the news broadcasts would be proved 
to be substantially true. 
C. Executive Privilege Should Not Apply to This 
Material. The City also opposed discovery of the Internal 
Affairs files on the grounds of a qualified common law 
evidentiary privilege, variously referred to as "official 
information," "governmental," or "executive privilege."5 
The "executive privilege is the government's 
privilege to prevent disclosure of certain information whose 
disclosure would be contrary to the public interest." 
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 342 (E.D. Pa. 
1973). "The controversy over executive privilege is as old 
as the Republic, and requires courts to balance the claims 
5
"Although executive privilege may also be asserted to 
prevent disclosure, it is not regarded as a 'public interest1 
privilege (or, indeed an evidentiary privilege in general). 
Instead, executive privilege is a constitutional doctrine 
grounded in the concept of separation of powers. It appears to 
encompass both official information and state secret 
claims. . . . " Comment, Discovery of Government Documents and 
the Official Information Privilege, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 142, 142 
n. 2, 1976. 
of the member of the public against the claims of government 
to confidentiality." McClain v. College Hospital, 492 A.2d 
991, 994 (N.J. 1985), citing United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 708 (1974); United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 
187, 192 (No. 14,694) (C.C.Va. 1807). 
The court must make an independent determination of 
the extent to which the privilege applies to the materials 
sought to be discovered. "These claims of privilege are not 
absolute. They may be overcome by [a party's] showing of 
necessity for the requested information, where the [party's] 
need is found to outweigh the governmental interest favoring 
secrecy." Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 481 (E.D. Mich. 
1977). Cf. Denver Policeman's Protective Ass'n v. 
Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1981); King v. 
Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Kelly v. City of 
San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 660 (N.D. Cal. 1987); 
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
The Utah Court of Appeals acknowledged the 
existence of the "executive privilege" in Meyers v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 747 P.2d 1058 (Utah App. 1987), but 
specifically noted "that the [executive] privilege is not 
absolute and the government's interest in maintaining 
confidentiality must be weighed against the interest of 
those seeking discovery of the material,," Ld. at 1060, 
citing Denver Policemen's Protective Assoc v. Lichtenstein, 
660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1981), 
In Meyers, a citizen brought an action for 
negligent misconduct against a Salt Lake City policeman. 
The citizen had made a complaint to the police department 
about the way he had been roughed up by a cop during a minor 
traffic incident. After an investigation the Internal 
Affairs Division determined the officer had used "excessive 
force" and notified the plaintiff by letter that his 
complaint had been sustained. The City objected to the 
introduction of the letter at trial claiming privilege. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling admitting 
the evidence, finding that the public interest was clearly 
served by disclosure rather than secrecy. 
Here, the City's interest in maintaining the 
confidentiality of Madsen's Internal Affairs files must be 
weighed against United Television's extraordinary interest 
in gaining access to the information in order to establish a 
defense against issues raised by Madsen in his defamation 
action. According to the Meyers court, this balance should 
be made pursuant to the analytical format approved by the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver Policemen's 
Protective Association v. Lichtensteiny 660 F.2d 432 (10th 
Cir. 1981)- See Meyers, 747 P.2d at 1060. Lichtenstein 
identifies a range of factors to be considered in applying 
the official information privilege. 
In that case, a civil rights case, the Tenth 
Circuit reviewed the lower court's approval of a state 
court's discovery order which allowed a citizen, who had 
been arrested for assaulting a police officer, to inspect 
some of the police department's investigatory files. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court after setting out 
the procedure for balancing the competing interests of the 
parties in a claim of executive privilege. 
The Court of Appeals commenced its analysis by 
noting that in applying the balancing test, a trial court 
oust consider (1) if the party asserting the right has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the documents, (2) if 
disclosure serves a compelling public interest, and (3) if 
the disclosure can be made in the least intrusive manner. 
The police officers were arguing in Lichtenstein that they 
had a right to privacy in the files which they compiled, and 
that this right prevented the disclosure of the potentially 
exculpatory information contained in these files. But the 
appellate court held that, even assuming the police officers 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy, that right could be 
overridden by a compelling public interest. The 
Lichtenstein court concluded that: 
The compelling state interest 
involved here is ascertainment of the 
truth. 
Id. 660 F.2d at 436. 
Inasmuch as the Lichtenstein case involved a 
"swearing match" between the citizen and the police 
officers, the Tenth Circuit held that ascertainment of the 
truth was a particularly important interest. That same 
interest, ascertainment of the truth, is similarly present 
in this case and it is especially important because the very 
essence of a defamation suit is the truth. Direct Import 
Buyers Ass'n v. K.S.L., Inc., 572 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1977); 
Ogden Buslines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1976). 
The Lichtenstein court taught that in suits between 
private citizens and police officers, it is important that 
the truth be presented. When a police officer brings suit 
against a private party, it is especially important that the 
officer and his employer not be allowed to suppress the 
truth by using a claim of executive privilege in a manner in 
which that privilege was never intended. The executive 
privilege was created to shield the government when it is 
the defendant in an action and there are compelling reasons 
to maintain the confidentiality of the information. The 
privilege was certainly never intended to allow the 
government to perpetrate a fraud on the courts by 
suppressing evidence in a case in which the party claiming 
the privilege is a government agent. 
Another compelling state interest in discovery 
acknowledged by the Lichtenstein court, is the "defendant's 
right to exculpatory material." ^d. 660 P.2d at 436. The 
Tenth Circuit wrote that "discovery of exculpatory material 
is a compelling state interest and is, indeed, an integral 
part of the right to a fair trial." Id. United Television 
has the same compelling need for exculpatory materials, if 
it is to have a fair trial in this action. 
Public confidence in our system of justice is 
threatened when relevant evidence is not made available. 
Id. at 436 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
709 (1974). The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, like the 
federal rules, reflect a basic philosophy that a party to 
civil action should be entitled to the disclosure of all 
relevant information in the possession of another person 
prior to trial, unless the information is privileged. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This mandate reflects the decision 
that "a trial [should be] less a game of blind man's buff 
[sic] and more a fair contest with the basic issues and 
facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." United 
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). 
As the court explained in Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 
F.R.D. at 661, "independent of . . . public perception of 
the system there are few things more important than doing 
justice in fact in individual cases." 
In the basic, most elemental form, Madsen complains 
that United Television's news stories defamed and injured 
his reputation as a law enforcement officer. (R. 2-7). 
United Television has a defense. That defense is truth. 
(R. 13, Verified Answer to Complaint 11 26). Were the 
statements contained in the KTVX news story true? If so, 
then United Television has a complete defense. Direct 
Import Buyers Ass'n v. K.S.L. Inc., 572 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 
1977); Ogden Buslines v. KSL Inc., 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 
1976). Yet, even if the statements were not true, United 
Television believes that Officer Madsen1s reputation is so 
bad that he was in no way damaged by the story. The truth 
can only be reached in this case by making the Internal 
Affairs files available to United Television. Without these 
files, however, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for 
United Television to discover the evidence it needs to 
defend itself in this action. 
Right now, under the court's order, Madsen is the 
only identifiable source of this information. From the 
materials thus far produced by the City, United Television 
has grave, justifiable doubts concerning Madsen1s 
veracity. Consider, for example, the numerous complaints 
citizens have made against Madsen concerning illegal search 
and entry, missing property, extortion, all of which 
indicate a dishonest side to Madsen1s character. (R. 158-
62. Addendum 2). 
Given Madsen*s well-documented, flawed character, 
United Television is entitled to the Internal Affairs 
investigation files. Yet, there are still more compelling 
interests which justify allowing United Television to 
discover these materials. There is the constitutionally 
mandated freedom of the press. 
The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as well as Art. I § 15 of the Utah 
Constitution, guarantees United Television the freedom to 
gather, broadcast and disseminate news. This right of 
investigative press is considered to be a right enjoyed by 
and necessary for the protection of the public. See Kearns-
Tribune Corp, v. Lewis,, 685 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1984). 
There is, then, a compelling public interest in the 
continued survival and vitality of the media, which is 
furthered in this instance by permitting United Television 
access to the Internal Affairs files. 
This compelling public interest is not advanced by 
shielding these materials. If United Television is denied 
discovery of this material, the effect both on United 
Television and other media organizations will be a chilling 
one. Denied access to the materials it needs to defend 
itself in a defamation suit, United Television will be less 
vigilant in pursuing the public's right to know. Once 
United Television is denied access to exculpatory materials, 
other media will also be less vigorous in advancing the 
public's interest by reporting on the conduct of 
governmental officials. See e.g. New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) ("[W]ould be critics of 
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their 
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even 
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can 
be proved in court. . . .") 
Given the numerous compelling public interests 
furthered by this discovery, a balance must be struck in 
favor of discovery. In opposition, the City offers but one 
argument: its Internal Affairs investigation process will be 
frustrated if United Television is permitted even limited 
access to this information. (R. 84). Yet, there is no 
reason to assume that because of the disclosure of their 
files concerning the repeated investigations of Madsen, that 
citizens will no longer complain about illegal and brutal 
acts by Madsen or other police officers or that the police 
will be less scrupulous in performing their self regulatory 
duties. See § VI, B, supra. 
The public interest is better served by disclosure 
in this instance. In fact, when faced with an identical 
argument, the Lichtenstein Court held that a complete ban on 
disclosure of Police Department files 
. . . is not necessary to protect 
the government's or the public's 
interest. Moreover, it is doubtful 
that citizens and police officers 
will absolutely refuse to cooperate 
in investigations because of a few 
isolated instances of disclosure. 
Id. 660 F.2d at 437. 
Lichtenstein is not the only instance in which a 
trial court has been called upon to face the government's 
argument that discovery of police department files will 
somehow injure the department. In Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 
7 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
 f for example, the court rejected the same 
argument made by the Milwaukee Police Department in a civil 
rights action brought by a citizen because of a Milwaukee 
police officer's use of excessive force. In refusing to 
suppress the Milwaukee Police Department Internal Affairs' 
files concerning the incident, the Wood court said: 
The danger of doing harm to the 
Milwaukee Police Department by 
allowing discovery of this file is 
not nearly so great as the harm that 
would surely result to the efficacy 
of our entire legal structure, 
including the Milwaukee Police 
Department, if a case such as this 
were won because the truth was 
hidden. 
Id. at 13. 
Coincidentally, the arguments advanced by the City, 
see § VI, B, supra, (R. 84), are virtually identical to the 
claims asserted by the Milwaukee Police Department in Wood 
v. Breier to support non-disclosure. Id. 54 F.R.D. at 12-
13. The Wood court clearly rejected the legal merit of 
those claims: 
It would not seem unreasonable to 
conclude viewing these arguments through legal 
eyes that the first two arguments are at best 
of remote impact. . . As for the third 
argument, . . . in any case as a matter of law 
when a public officer is charged by law to 
perform a duty, there can be no dilemma about 
whether to perform it. 
Id. at 13. As pointed out previously, the court in King v. 
Conde, 121 F.R.D. at 192, urged courts to be wary of relying 
on the "chilling effect" argument to restrict discovery of 
internal investigation files. 
The possibility of disclosure in a subsequent civil 
action is probably not of great import to the officers at 
the time of the investigation. See Denver Policemanf s 
Protective Association v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 437; 
King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. at 192-93; Kelly v. City San Jose, 
114 F.R.D. at 665; Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. at 12-13. In 
King v. Conde, the police department could not point to any 
empirical evidence to support the "chilling" contention. 
Without some basis for believing that real police officers 
conceal or distort their statements to internal 
investigatory bodies, the court should reject this 
contention. King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. at 193. See also, 
Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. at 664-65. In King, 
Judge Weinstein cited the lack of empirical evidence to 
underscore the responsibility of courts to restrict 
disclosure only on the basis of substantial showings of 
specific harm outweighing the specific interests favoring 
disclosure. King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. at 193. 
In this instance, the City has not advanced any 
evidence whatsoever to support its contention of a 
"chilling" effect. Naturally, to do so would call into 
serious doubt the credibility of the City's own police 
officers, including Madsen. For that very reason, it is 
imperative that these documents be produced in order that 
United Television be allowed access to reliable, documentary 
evidence. 
The City also contends that citizen complainants 
may refuse to cooperate in these investigations if they 
learn that the sources will be subject to scrutiny by the 
courts and civil litigants. (R. 91). As pointed out above, 
see § VI, B, supra, this argument has been routinely 
rejected. See King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. at 194; 
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. at 344; Martinelli v. 
District Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Col. 1980). 
The only evidence of this fear of chilling citizen 
candor comes from the affidavit of then acting Chief Glen E. 
Johnson: 
It has been affiant's experience that 
disclosure of the internal investigation files 
in any action, including this one, seriously 
•impairs internal investigations. It undermines 
the expectation of police officers and of 
witnesses that their statements during an 
internal investigation will always be treated 
in a confidential manner and closes sources of 
information we must have in order to develop 
leads to keep our department free from 
corruption. 
(R. 110, Johnson Affidavit at 1(12). This sworn statement is 
identical to the affidavit of former Chief E.L. "Bud" 
Willoughby filed in support of the City's attempts to 
prevent disclosure in Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp. (R. 
173-180). It is "interesting" that these two statements are 
absolutely identical even though sworn to years apart by 
different men under different circumstances. 
In Kelly v. City of San Jose, the court emphasized 
that an affidavit signed by the Chief of Police claiming the 
government privilege on the grounds of "public interest" is 
insufficient to overcome the burden placed on the parties 
seeking to shield material from discovery. Icl. 114 F.R.D. 
at 672. It is certainly understandable why the City favors 
this secrecy: secrecy suppresses, discourages and prevents 
criticism. But, is a total envelope of secrecy surrounding 
the Internal Affairs1 policies and procedures justified in 
this case, and is this secrecy really in the public 
interest? The First Amendment says no. The entire American 
concept of justice says no. 
In Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 344 (E.D. Pa. 
1973) a civil rights action against police officers, the 
court carefully balanced the public interest in the 
confidentiality of governmental information against the 
needs of a litigant to obtain data, not otherwise available 
to him. The court found it clear that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to discovery of the signed statements of witnesses 
and those portions of the police reports containing factual 
data. The court wrote: "No harm to the public interest can 
flow from such discovery." Id. at 345. 
Similarly, in King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180 
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) the Court held that plaintiffs in federal 
civil rights actions are presumptively entitled to these 
documents, except for reasonable redactions of names and 
addresses to protect legitimate privacy interests or 
informer sources when to reveal them would not infer any 
°The Court identified 10 factors to weigh in the 
analysis: "(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart 
governmental processes by discouraging citizens from giving the 
government information; (2) the impact upon persons who have 
given information of having their identities disclosed; (3) the 
degree to which governmental self-evaluation and consequent 
program improvement will be chilled by disclosure; (4) whether 
the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary; (5) 
whether the party seeking the discovery is an actual or potential 
defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending or reasonably 
likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether the 
police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any 
intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may 
arise from the investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff's suit is 
non-frivolous and brought in good faith; (9) whether the 
information sought is available through other discovery or from 
other sources; and (10) the importance of the information sought 
to the plaintiff's case." Id. at 344. 
substantial advantage to the party seeking discovery. The 
Court also required a balancing analysis be followed if the 
police met their initial burden of showing that some 
restrictions may be required on complete disclosure. Id. at 
198.7 Cf. Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987); McClain v. College Hospital, 492 A.2d 991 (N.J. 
1985) (a patient's estate's wrongful death action against 
hospital and physicians alleging medical malpractice; the 
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed trial court's order to 
disclose the investigative records of State Board of Medical 
Examiners after balancing the government's interest in 
confidentiality against the interest of the private litigant 
to have access to relevant information not otherwise 
available); Weinstein v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 391 
N.E.2d 881 (Mass. 1979) (court ordered release of portions 
of police department's investigatory files). 
'The Court identified six factors disfavoring disclosure 
which may be considered (1) threat to police officers' own 
safety; (2) invasion of police officers' privacy; (3) weakening 
of law enforcement programs; (4) chilling of police internal 
investigative candor; (5) chilling of citizen complaint candor; 
and (6) state privacy law. The Court identified four factors to 
be considered favoring disclosure: (1) relevance to the 
plaintiff's case; (2) importance to the plaintiff's case; (3) 
strength of the plaintiff's case; and (4) importance to the 
public interest. 
In this instance, the balancing process clearly 
favors disclosure. The police department's main interest in 
secrecy is not to protect "confidential informants,,f but 
rather to suppress information about one policeman's alleged 
and actual misconduct. Pursuant to the department's own 
regulations, the target of the complaint is allowed to know 
the identity of the complainant. Only the public is kept in 
the dark. On the other side of the equation is the search 
for truth and justice, the fundamental purpose of this legal 
system. Also, weighing heavily in favor of disclosure are 
the protections afforded by the U.S. and Utah Constitutions 
to a free press and the effect withholding this information 
may have on those protections. 
1. Chilling Effect on First Amendment 
Rights. If United Television is denied access to Madsen's 
Internal Affairs files, United Television will be denied the 
evidence it needs to ascertain the truth behind Madsen's 
allegations in this defamation action where truth is the 
ultimate defense. The United States and Utah Constitutions 
guarantee the press the right to gather, broadcast and 
disseminate news. This right, however, is not really the 
right of the press, but the right of the public which is 
exercised through the efforts of a vigilant and vigorous 
press. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 518 
(Utah 1984). The government justifiably carries a heavy 
burden to show justification for imposition of restraints on 
the freedom of the press to report matters of public 
interest. 
If United Television is denied the evidence needed 
to defend itself against Officer Madsen's charges, then a 
high probability exists that United Television, and other 
news media, will, in the future, be less vigorous in 
pursuing the public's right to know. A reporter, in the 
future, might again obtain reliable information alleging 
police misconduct. Faced with the specter of another 
defamation suit and not knowing if the ultimate evidence 
proving the allegation will be concealed by the government 
or made available, the reporter might be well advised not to 
report the story. Society's right to be informed about a 
legitimate subject of public interest will be defeated. See 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
While the determination of the issue raised in this 
petition has overwhelming significance for this case, it 
also will have an impact beyond the parameters of Madsen's 
complaint. This clearly is a matter of importance which 
might recur. It is an issue of great import to the function 
of the press in this state, and to the entire community. As 
one court has written: 
The abuse of a patrolman's office can 
have great potentiality for social harm; 
hence, public discussion and public criticism 
directed towards the performance of that 
office cannot constitutionally be inhibited by 
threats of prosecution under state libel laws. 
Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 239 
N.E.2d 837, 841 (111. 1968). The determination of the 
availability of these investigatory files in this type of 
action will have a significant impact on future public 
discussion and public criticism of any abases by policemen 
and other government officials. 
2. Public Interest in a Fair Trial. The public 
interest in the right to a fair trial is strong and well 
entrenched. Included with the right to fair trial is the 
right of the defendant to obtain exculpatory evidence. As 
the court noted in Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. 
Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir. 1981), discovery 
of exculpatory material is by itself a compelling state 
interest favoring disclosure. The information in the 
investigative documents is needed to establish the true 
record of Madsen's performance as a policeman as well as his 
reputation among his peers and the general population. It 
is important to note that these are the very matters put at 
issue by Madsen. Should a police officer be free to bring a 
defamation action against a news organization for reporting 
about the officer's record and then have the police 
department conceal the evidence? 
3. Ascertainment of Truth, Another particularly 
important state interest frustrated by the protective order 
is the ascertainment of truth. "The generation that made 
the nation thought secrecy in government one of the 
instruments of Old World Tyranny and committed itself to the 
principle that a democracy cannot function unless the people 
are permitted to know what their government is up to." 
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 105 
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
The Lichtenstein court recognized the ascertainment 
of truth as a compelling state interest, sufficient to 
override any legitimate expectation of privacy police 
officers might have in information contained in internal 
investigatory files. That same interest is similarly 
present and achieves especial importance in this case 
because the ultimate issue in a defamation suit is the 
truth. It is absurd to allow the police officer and the 
government in this action to suppress the truth by using a 
claim of executive privilege in a manner in which that 
privilege was never intended to be used. United Television 
did not bring this action. The privilege was certainly 
never intended to allow the government to suppress evidence 
which might defeat a government agent's claim. 
D. The Work Product Doctrine and Attorney-Client 
Privilege Are Wholly Inapplicable to the Type of Information 
at Issue in This Case. The City also contends that the 
Internal Affairs files are protected by the work product 
and/or attorney client privilege. (R. 93-95). In 
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 341-42 (E.D. Pa. 
1973) the court found objections based on the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine in this 
context "to be palpably inapplicable." Likewise, in Kelly 
v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 659 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
the court noted that the work-product doctrine would rarely 
offer protection to the kind of information contained in 
these files. 
Clearly, since the Salt Lake City Police Department 
is under an affirmative duty, in the normal course of 
performing its public function, to generate the kind of 
information at issue here, the policies that inspire the 
work product doctrine are wholly inapplicable. See, e.g., 
Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090, 1119-20 (E.D.N.C. 
1984). See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 
(1947); Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 495 P.2d 1254 
(Utah 1972). 
The California Court of Appeals has strictly 
construed the attorney-client privilege with respect to 
police department internal investigation files. In Gonzales 
v. Municipal Court, 136 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Cal. App. 1977), the 
court held where a police officer makes statements to 
investigators knowing that they would be transmitted to the 
city attorney for the city's defense in potential civil 
litigation, but also knowing that the same statements could 
be the basis for a disciplinary proceeding against him if 
grounds therefore were indicated, the police officer was not 
entitled to assert the attorney-client privilege. 
In the instant case, the City has not alleged any 
facts to support an attorney-client privilege claim under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) (1953). The purpose of the 
internal investigation was to gather all pertinent 
information relating to possible police misconduct to enable 
the police department to evaluate the conduct of the officer 
and to determine appropriate disciplinary action. The 
Internal Affairs files are not a part of an exclusive 
consultation process between lawyer and client, or among 
representatives of the client designed to facilitate the 
rendition of legal services to the client. Nor were they 
requested by a lawyer to evaluate a client's legal 
situation, Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 495 P.2d 1254 
(Utah 1972) . 
E. Police Department Internal Affairs Files Are 
Not Protected by "Private Papers" Legislation Intended to 
Regulate Public Inspection of Government Documents, The 
City also contends that Internal Affairs files are protected 
by a "private papers" privilege. (R. 93-95). In enacting 
the Archives and Records Services and Information Practices 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 - 90 (1986), the legislature 
articulated the following public policy: "In enacting this 
act, the Legislature recognized two fundamental 
constitutional rights: (a) the right of privacy in relation 
to personal data gathered by state agencies, and (b) the 
public's right of access to information concerning the 
conduct of the public's business." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-60(2). Judge Greene suggests that these statutes 
might be thought of as state freedom of information laws. 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F. Supp. 
1308 (D. Utah 1987). Similarly, the Public and Private 
Writings Act, provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to 
inspect and take a copy of any public writing of this state 
except as otherwise expressly provided by statute." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-26-2 (1987). 
In Tighe v. City and County of Honolulu, 520 P.2d 
1345 (Haw. 1974), the City of Honolulu relied upon similar 
statutes to resist discovery of police internal 
investigation files in connection with an action for 
assaults allegedly committed by police officers. The Hawaii 
Supreme Court found that the city's reliance was 
"misplaced." Id. at 1348. The Court carefully explained 
that the statutes regulated the public inspection, 
observation and exploration of public records by any citizen 
during business hours and was in no way intended to infringe 
upon a private litigant's right to discovery under the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Cf. City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 
544 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Ariz. App. 1976) ("The records may be 
confidential as against the public at large, but inspection 
must be allowed to the plaintiffs in such an action if they 
are to compile data necessary to proving their case."); see 
also City of Phoenix v. Peterson, 462 P.2d 829, 833 (Ariz. 
App. 1969); Byrne v. City and County of Honolulu, 533 P.2d 
871 (Haw. 1975); Cook v. King County, 510 P.2d 659 (Wash. 
App. 1973). 
Likewise, the discovery rights granted to litigants 
under the provisions of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) are not 
limited by the terms of legislative provisions directed 
toward regulation of an entirely different situation. The 
Archives and Records Services and Information Practices Act 
and the Public and Private Writings Act regulate general 
public inspection of all public records not a private 
litigant's right to conduct discovery. 
VII. 
FAILURE TO COMPEL DIRECT DISCOVERY OF THE 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS FILES WHERE SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION COULD NOT SATISFY THE THRESHOLD 
SHOWING THAT DISCLOSURE WOULD RESULT IN 
SPECIFIC HARM WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
District courts have the discretionary power to 
control discovery activities in cases pending before them. 
A district court order affecting discovery will be 
overturned on appeal only if it amounts to an abuse of 
discretion. State of Oregon, ex rel. Worden v. Drinkwalter, 
700 P.2d 150, 152 (Mont. 1985). "The discretion, however, 
is a legal discretion. . . . It does not include the 
privilege of incorrect application of law or a decision 
predicated upon irrational bases." Brown v. Superior Court, 
670 P.2d 725, 730 (Ariz. 1983). 
In this case the trial court simply accepted the 
City's claim that purported harm to the public interest in 
law enforcement outweighed United Television's interest in 
obtaining discovery. If the balancing requirements 
recommended by other courts, including the Utah Court of 
Appealsf which have carefully considered the private 
litigant's right to discover police department internal 
investigation files had been followed discovery should have 
been ordered. The City did not meet the threshold burden of 
proving substantial harm to specific interests. The trial 
court abused its discretionary function by ordering 
nondisclosure of the Internal Affairs files without a 
sufficient showing of harm. The trial court's decision to 




For all of the foregoing reasons United Television 
Inc. respectfully submits that the trial court should be 
directed to enter an order requiring the Salt Lake City 
Police Department to produce to United Television Inc. all 
of the Internal Affairs files concerning Officer Madsen 
without redaction of any information, 
DATED: July _J2_iL..' 1989. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
The lomas R. Karrenberg 
50 West Broadway, 6th Fl6br 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, this a. & J'k day of July, 1989, four 
true and correct copies each of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief to: 
Jerome H. Mooney 
Mooney & Associates 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Greg R. Hawkins, Esq. 
Assistant City Attorney 
324 South State, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
W fl (I M 3 (I CI If 
A D D E N D U M 1 
GREG R. HAWKINS, No. 1429 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake City 
Corporation 
324 South State, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 535-7788 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




a Delaware corporation, and ] 
JOHN HARRINGTON, 
Defendants. 
i O R D E R 
i Civil No. C88-1933 
i Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion for a Protective Order 
to prevent discovery of Internal Affairs files and personnel 
files is: 
(1) Denied as to the personnel file. Salt Lake City 
Corporation is to make the personnel file available for 
inspection and copying. The parties are ordered to not make the 
information public nor disclose the information or documents 
contained therein to other people except as necessary in 
preparing for trial* 
(2) Granted as to the Internal Affairs files. The City is 
to disclose the initial Complaint, deleting all names; also the 
disposition of the Complaint, deleting all names. All other 
information is privileged and is not to be disclosed. The 
A D D E N D U M 1 
information ordered furnished is not to be made public nor 
disclosed to other people except as necessary in preparing for 
trial
- /7^6 
DATED this «jfe^  day of October, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
THOMAS k. KARRENBEIJ6 
Attorney for United 
Television, Inc. 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Third District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Protective Order to the below listed parties by placing the same 
in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon, this J A ^ day of 
October, 1988: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
United Television, Inc. 
Jerome H. Mooney, Esq. 
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
GRH:rc 
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uinn Aims AGAINSI UAVIO G. MADSLN 
LOfiPiAiiiAnr 
H iy73 to 1908 

























THREATS WITH SHOTGUN 
THREATS 















DAMAGE TO IMPOUNDED CAR 
DA1E 
























LOnriAINIS AGAINST DAVID G. MAOSEN 1973 to 1980 page two 
























UNECESSARY BOOKING IN JAIL 
POLICE TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
OFFICER PUT. SHOTGUN IN FACE 
THREATS/PROFANITY 
HARASSMENT/TIIREA1S 




ASSAULT/GUN IN FACE; 
POSSIBLE THEFT OF MONEY 
RUDENESS/PROFANITY 
UNNECESSARY ROUGHNESS 




























i W l A M T b AfiAlNbT DAV1U G. MAUSEN 1973 to 1900 



























UNECESSARY USE OF SERVICE 
REVOLVER 














































CUnrLAHUS AGAHISf 0AV10 G. IIAUSLH 1973 tq 1988 
































































DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 
FOUL & ABUSIVE LANGUAGE/ 
NOT SUSTAINED 12/3/04 
EXONERAIED 
NOT SUSTAINED 12/3/04 
NOT SUSTAINED 6/27/05 
NOT SUSTAINED 1/17/06 
EXONERATED 1/17/06 
EXONERATED 
CUltriA1IIIS AGAINST UAVIO G. MADStN 1973 to 1988 pdge f i v e 
COMPLAINANT DATE OF 
5/26/87 
9/1/B7 
9 /1 /87 
COMPLAINT ALLEGATION 









EXPUIIGLU HIVES! 10/ 
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
STAFF INSPECTIONS DIVISION 
October I, 1977 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS PROCEDURES 
PREMISE OF OPERATION 






A. How received 
1. Citizen complaints are received in several ways, and 
are of varying degrees of seriousness. Whenever the complaint 
against an officer is of a serious nature, the citizen complaining 
is required to make his accusation in writing. Complaints of theft 
or brutality are considered serious, and require a signed and notarized 
complaint form. Other complaints which accuse an officer of serious 
misconduct may also require a signed and notarized complaint. 
2. Upon request, an accused officer will be furnished a copy of 
the complaint. 
3. Each complaint received, requires that the person complaining 
A n n i r M n i V M ** 
» »*"*;• *i oo i i^ i mm m • » • **+*• * ^ n a w i i » « w » **r** • -•»«V,^M**M r c » - » ^ - , ^ - r >»> 
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submit to a polygraoh examination if he is asked to do so. The 
complainant is informed that he will be required to taKe the 
polygraph BEFORE any officer, if the investigation should require 
it. 
3. Noti f ications 
1. As soon as the officer who has been complained against is 
identified, his division commander is notified. 
2. A copy of the complaint is forwarced for review by each 
major, the lieutenant colonel, and the cnief of police. After 
reading the complaint, they initial the copy and return it to 
internal affairs where it is filed. 
C. Classification of Complaints 
The internal affairs unit of staff inspections division, upon 
receiving any complaint, shall assign the complaint to one of the 
following categories: 
1. Complaints alleging criminal misconduct. 
2. Complaints alleging serious violations of rules and 
regulations. 
*3. Simple complaints concerning rudeness, dress, etc. 
Type (I) and type (2) complaints will be investigated by 
internal affairs with a complete report submitted to the chief of 
police. 
Type (3) complaints will be referred to the division commanding 
officer of the accused officer. Upon completion of the division inve 
igation, the commanding officer has three responsibilities: (I) assi 
a disposition, (2) notify the officer of the disposition, and (3) 
notify the complainant. In cases handled by the division as with 
-3-
alI other cases the final decision for aporopriate disciplinary 
actions rests with the chief of police. All cases closed by 
division or by the internal affairs are subject to review by 
h is off ice. 
*ALL COMPLAINTS WHICH INVOLVE TWO OR MORE OFFICERS FROM 
DIFFERENT DIVISIONS WILL 5E INVESTIGATED 3Y INTERNAL AFFAIRS. 
D. I nvestication 
1. At any time during the investigation of a complaint, an 
officer may be represented by legal counsel. 
2. Normal investigation procedures are then utilized to obtain 
every possible piece of information relating to the case in question. 
The objective is to determine the facts in a completely impartial 
manner. 
3. Statements will be taken from the complainant, all witnesses 
to the incident who can be located, and from the officers complained 
against. 
E. Use of Polvcraoh 
1. An officer under investigation originating out of a citizen 
complaint, will only be requested to submit to a polygraph examination 
under certain specified conditions. In NO CASE, will a polygraph 
examination be requested until all other investigative avenues have 
been exhausted. 
2. An officer may be requested to submit to a polygraph 
examination when: 
a. There are direct conflicts between the positions of the 
complainant and the officer AND the case is deemed important enough 
to require such a request. The citizen complaining must submit to 
the polygraph examination EEr0RE the officer. If he refuses, or if 
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the results of the examination do net suDDort his position, the officer 
will not be requested to take the examination. 
b. If statements obtained from other witnesses indicare The officer 
may be lying, a polygraph examination may be requested. 
3. When polygraph tests are administered, questions will be 
limited to the direct issue under investigation. 
4. All questions to be asked during the examination will be 
reviewed with the officer prior to the examination. He may be allowed 
to discuss these questions with his attorney, if he so desires. 
INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 
A. Internal investigations concerning misconduct or criminal 
violations may be originated from information received from citizens, 
outside agencies, police officers or other department employees, or 
from information obtained during routine inspectional functions. 
B. Internal affairs is also charged with the responsibility of 
conducting an independent investigation into any incident which may 
involve a question of adherance to the rules and regulations of the 
department as directed by administration. Shooting incidents and high 
speed chases may fall into this category. 
C. In the event that all investigative leads have been exhausted, 
and there is still strong reason to believe that the officer in question 
is deliberately withholding important information relevant to the 
investigation, the officer may be requested to take a polygraph examination. 
D. If, during the course of the investigation, it becomes apparent 
that the officer has committed or may have committed an act which amounts 
to a felony, the chief of police will be notified immedicrely. 
The chief of police may then, at his descretion, reassign the 
case to the detective division or may assign a member of the detective 
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division to work wiTh the internal affairs investigator. 
CCNCLUS1CN OF INVEST!GAT1CN 
Internal affairs is only a fact-finding unit. No reccmmendarions 
are made concerning discipline. Upon completion of the investigation 
the investigator assigned will be required to assign one of the 
following diseesitions: 
1. Unfounded. The allegation was nor factual. 
2. Exonerated. The alleged incident did occur, but the officers 
actions were lawful and reasonable under the circumstances. 
3. Not sustained. Insufficient evidence to prove or disprove the 
alIegations. 
4. Sustained. The officers are guilty of the act or ommission 
a Ileged. 
Upon completion of the investigation, the investigator will: 
1. Prepare a "sign off" sheet listing case number and attaching 
it, 
2. Include all reports relevant to the case. 
3. Prepare an investigation summary report wnich will indicaTe 
tne invesrigators findings and recommended disoosition. 
Following their review of the investigation, the chief of police 
and majors assuming they agree with the investigators disposition, 
they will "sign off", or concur. The reports are then returned to 
internal affairs where the case is closed and filed. 
The final decision for appropriate disciplinary action rests 
with the cnief of police. After thar decision has been made the accuses 
officer is notified. The compIainanT is also notified, but is told only 
that his accusation was sustained and that aoorocriare disciplinary 
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action will be taken. 
When a complaint is sustained the division commander of the officer 
involved may be asked to review the facrs and make a recommendation for 
appropriate discipline. 
Upon return of the recommendations from the division commander, 
tne chief anc/or major may ask the officer to aopear before them to answer 
questions. The accused officer should also have, if he desire, the 
option of presenting his case before the chief whether requested to do 
so or not. The investigator from internal affairs may also be asKed to 
appear to present the facts as revealed by the investigation and to 
answer questions. 
The chief of police may also, at his discretion, appoint a board 
to assist in the review of the case facts and assist in a determination 
as to final disposition and discipline. 
Only those complaints which are sustained and result in disciplinary 
action, involving suspension without pay, are made a part of the 
officerfs personnel file and civil service file. 
SECURITY 
A. Internal affairs investigations are important and sensitive 
matters. To guarantee their security the following procedures have 
been establi shed. 
1. Internal investigation files of police officers and employees 
shall be considered to be the personal files of the chief of police. 
2. All investigative material, e.g. complaints, to-froms, 
depositions, statements, tapes, and inspections are kept in a separate 
metal filing cabinet which is kept locked at all times. The cabinet 
is marked as containing "Conf idential Restricted Material.,? 
3. The onlv kevs to the investication file cabinet are kent bv 
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internal affairs investigators and the commanding officer of staff 
inspections division. 
4. The file and irs contents shall be available for inspection 
by: 
a. Internal affairs personnel 
b. Majors and lieutenant colonel 
c. The chief of police 
d. Other persons whom the chief may personally authorize 
(1) The accused officer, with consent of the chief, may 
authorize release of information to his own attorney to be used in his 
own defense. 
(2) Upon receipt of a subpoena; however, any subpoena will 
be strongly resisted by the chief of police and a court order requested 
prior to release of information. 
5. Files removed in accordance with the above criteria must be 
recorded on a written log containing the name of the person who removed 
the file, the date and time it was removed and the purpose for the removal, 
6. To further guarantee the confidentiality of internal 
investigations material, the following inter-office procedures have 
been established: 
a. All investigative material to be typed or otherwise handled 
within the division is kept in a closed security envelope at all times 
other than during actual typing. 
b. Internal affairs secretary's desk has been equipped with a 
steel locking bar and padlock. All materials which may be in the 
process of being typed are locked in the desk at any time the secretary 
is away from her desk for any reason. 
c. The only persons authorized to make copies of any investigative 
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material from this unit are the assigned personnel. 
EXPUNGEMENT 0- IN"-NA1_ 4"*1R?S "1LE5 
It is the policy of internal affairs to regularly expunge the 
records of police personnel tnat have been investigated. 




3. Not sustained 
The files of the above catagories are maintained for 90 days. 
They then are placed in a suspense or dead file for an additional 90 
days. At the end of 180 days they are then destroyed by fire or 
shredding. 
The reason for the expungement procedure outlined above is that 
there is a 90 day period of time in which a complainant may file a 
law suit. 
Sustained complaints which did not result in suspension from 
duty without pay may also be expunged after six months time upon 
application of the accused officer and with the approval of the chief 
of police. 
At the time of expungement the officer may, upon application 
obtain possession of the complaint originally made by the citizen. 
Reports of the investigation itself as prepared by the investigating 
officer are not provided to the officer but will be destroyed by 
internal affairs investigators. 
SECTION 76-8-506 OF THE 
CRIMINAL CODE SAYS A 
PERSON IS GUILTY OF A 
CLASS "B" MISDEMEANOR IF 
HE: 
(I) KNOWINGLY GIVES FALSE 
INFORMATION TO ANY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER 
WITH A PURPOSE OF 
INDUCING THE OFFICER 
TO BELIEVE ANOTHER HAS 
COMMITTED AN OFFENSE 
